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2Abstract
Subsidised employment is an important tool of active labour market policies to improve the reemployment
chances of the unemployed. Using unusually informative individual data from administrative records we
investigate the effects of two different schemes of subsidised temporary employment implemented in
Switzerland: non-profit employment programmes (EP) and a subsidy for temporary jobs (TEMP) in
private and public firms. Econometric matching methods show that TEMP is more successful than EP in
getting the unemployed back to work. Compared to not participating in any programme EP and TEMP are
ineffective for unemployed who find jobs easily anyway or have a short unemployment spell. For
potential and actual long term unemployed both programmes may have positive effects, but the effect of
TEMP is larger.
Keywords
Subsidised temporary job, employment programme, temporary work contracts, active labour market
policies, matching on the propensity score, Switzerland
JEL classification: J38, J68
31 Introduction
Subsidised employment is an important tool of labour market policy in many developed countries. It exists
not only in countries using the 'European' type of a more interventionist approach to labour market policy
(like France, Germany, Sweden, ...), but it is also used by countries firmly based on the Anglo-Saxon
model of the labour market, like the USA (Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC), Great Britain (as part of the
new deal), and Canada (the Targeted Wage Subsidies and the Self-sufficiency Project).
There are considerable differences in the design of the subsidy schemes. The most common form is a
wage subsidy with possibly some additional allowance for the employers and / or employees fixed cost. It
may be paid either to the employer, the employee, or to both. The subsidy itself may be permanent (con-
ditional on low earnings, like the EITC), or it may have a maximum eligibility period. The programmes
may be directed at subsidising strictly temporary employment or just decreasing the initial wage to be paid
by the employer for a job that is supposed to become a permanent one. Furthermore, within the subsidy
schemes for temporary jobs: It could be a 'real' job in a firm operating in competitive markets, or the sub-
sidised job may be in some specialised non-profit operation active in some sheltered part of the economy.
It is this difference that is the main focus of this paper. Finally, the actual direct cost of programme par-
ticipation to individuals, the unemployment insurance system, and society as a whole may also differ
substantially between the different schemes.
Even in the case of subsidies for temporary jobs different ways to implement the subsidy may influence its
effects. These types of subsidies offer temporary employment that otherwise would not be accepted by the
unemployed or would not be created by firms. The reasons could be the access to unemployment and wel-
fare benefits for the unemployed or minimum employment costs (minimum wages, unionised sector, or
other restrictions increasing wage costs) on the side of the employer. So far few theoretical and compara-
tive empirical research has been devoted to analyse differential effects of different employment subsidies.1
A major reason is probably that usually cross-country studies would be needed to compare the different
schemes. However, cross-country studies face the substantial problem of comparing two programmes
under potentially very different labour market conditions. Therefore, it would be useful to 'partial out' the
effect of local labour market conditions by comparing different programmes within the same country that
are accessible to the same group of unemployed. Furthermore, a large and informative data base is
necessary to address the selection issues that pop up in every evaluation study. This is a particularly
                                                          
1 An exception are experimental studies in the USA which compared wage subsidies paid to the employee and the
employer, respectively (Burtless, 1985, Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987) and two recent studies of the Swedish
active labour market policy (Carling and Richardson, 2001, and Sianesi, 2002) that however address somewhat
different issues.
4demanding task when one concentrates on the more subtle differences between two programmes that may
be only small parts of the usually diverse active labour market policy a particular country runs.
Switzerland can be used to study the differences between two versions of employment subsidies that both
operate on a larger scale and both are targeted at more or less the same population of unemployed. Both
programmes use subsidised temporary employment to increase the reemployment chances of their partici-
pants. The crucial difference is that one programme operates as a non-profit employment programme,
whereas the other one subsidises temporary jobs in firms operating in a competitive environment.
Furthermore, in the Swiss case a large and exceptionally informative individual data base (coming from
various administrative registers) is available that was previously used by Gerfin and Lechner (2002, GL
hereafter) for a microeconometric evaluation study of several active labour market policies. Although not
of primary interest in their study, GL already note a substantial difference between the effects of the two
types of temporary employment subsidies. Recent evaluation studies of the Swedish active labour market
policies, for example, also draw the general conclusion that programmes most closely attached to a 'real'
job in a competitive environment dominate other programmes (Carling and Richardson, 2001, and Sianesi,
2001). The main difference to the Swedish subsidised jobs programme is that subsidised jobs are expected
to become permanent in Sweden, while in Switzerland they are expected to be temporary.
Our empirical findings based on matching methods strongly confirm the positive effects of the subsidy for
temporary jobs (TEMP) as compared to the employment programme (EP) type of the subsidy on average.
We dismiss the concern that the positive effects are due to the participants of TEMP taking up inferior, i.e.
jobs paying less than the jobs subsequent to the current unemployment spell. With respect to possible
differential effects of the programmes for different groups of unemployed we find both programmes to be
more effective in raising reemployment probabilities for the unemployed having substantial difficulties in
the labour market. However, even for the 'better risks' TEMP seems to have some, albeit small positive
effects. It appears that TEMP and EP are adding human capital, although with different effectiveness.
However, we cannot rule out that signalling effects also play a role in explaining our results as well. In
terms of direct costs of the programmes TEMP is much less costly than EP (and not participating in any
programme), which adds to the positive assessment of TEMP.
In summary, this paper contributes to the literature in several ways: First, it considerably extends the data
base used by GL allowing a more detailed analysis of the outcomes achieved by the programmes. The
time horizon is extended and other variables measuring the quality of employment are now available. Sec-
ond, by focussing on two specific and similar types of programmes we are able to analysis their difference
in participant selection and the resulting outcomes in a much more profound and informative way. We
relate these differences to the different institutional set-ups and discuss theoretical implications. We check
5whether the expected effect heterogeneity resulting from these considerations can actually be found in the
data.
The structure of the paper is as follows: The following section describes the Swiss programmes in some
depth. Section 3 briefly reviews theoretical concepts on why these different types of programmes may
have different effects for different individuals. Section 4 as well as Appendix A describe the data and pre-
sent some descriptive results for the differences between the different groups of participants. Section 5
gives a summary of the econometrics used, which is a multiple treatment evaluation framework using a
'matching on the propensity score' estimator. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes. Ap-
pendix B contains the results of the estimation of the propensity scores in a multinomial probit framework.
Appendix C describes the extent of the common support problem and our remedies. Appendix D adds
results concerning the subgroup heterogeneity of the effects.
2 Subsidised employment as part of active labour market policies:
the Swiss case
As already noted subsidised employment can take many forms. Switzerland uses two different types of
subsidies to foster reintegration of the unemployment into the labour market. To understand the effects of
the programmes and the composition of the different groups of participants, it is necessary to understand
the specifics of the programme as well as the institutional environment in which they operate.
Swiss unemployment insurance
The basic rules of the Swiss unemployment insurance (UI) in the period of interest are as follows: Benefit
entitlement lasts for a maximum of two years (conditional on employment history). The entitlement period
consists of two parts: in the initial 30 weeks benefits are unconditional on programme participation, the
remaining entitlement is in principle conditional on some participation. The benefit level in the two pe-
riods is the same. However, in practice these rules are not strictly enforced: It is not unusual to participate
in a programme in the first 30 weeks. More frequently, unemployed receive the benefits in the conditional
period without any participation in ALMP, because no programme is offered. The entitlement is condi-
tional on a previous contribution to the unemployment insurance for at least 6 months within the past two
years. After the two year entitlement period expires, receiving a new entitlement period is conditional on
being employed for at least 12 months within three years after the end of the previous unemployment
6spell. The replacement ratio is usually 80% of the insured earnings, depending on socio-demographic
characteristics.2 The maximum monthly benefit is about CHF 7000.
Switzerland runs a substantial and diverse active labour market policy.3 The active labour market pro-
grammes (ALMP) in Switzerland can be grouped into three categories: a) training, b) employment pro-
grammes, and c) subsidised temporary jobs. Training consists of a wide variety of courses, ranging from
basic courses to specific work-related training. The differences between b) and c) are discussed below in
detail.
A specificity of the Swiss system of active labour market policy is that the cantons are obliged by law to
fill a minimum number of places per year. Until January 2000 the nation-wide minimum was 25'000
yearly places distributed across cantons according to their unemployment rates in the previous year. By
comparison, the number of registered job seekers was about 190'000 in 1997 and 140'000 in 1998.
Employment Programmes (EP)
Employment programmes are offered by both public and private institutions. There is no substantial dif-
ference between the type of 'jobs' offered by the two different groups of providers of these programmes.
The usual individual participation duration is about six months. There are two different types of pro-
grammes: either it is a single position, i.e. a special job in a public organisation (e.g. administration or
hospitals), or it is a collective programme. Collective programmes are carried out by specialised non-profit
organisations. The jobs should be as similar as possible to regular employment, but they should be
extraordinary, i.e. the organisers of employment programmes should not be in competition with other
firms. However, in practice some organising firms may operate on the same market as other private firms
with comparable products (e.g. in the repair and restoration sector). Collective employment programmes
are regulated by the cantonal unemployment offices in consultation with the employer and the employee
organisations.4 In conclusion, employment programmes can be seen as fully subsidised labour in a non-
profit organisation. In most cases the subsidy even exceeds 100%, because some of the costs of capital,
overhead costs, and so on may be reimbursed as well.
Unemployed are placed in employment programmes by the labour office. Participation is compulsory.
Interviews we conducted at the placement offices strongly suggest that it is not unusual that case workers
use employment programmes as a test for the willingness to work. While participating in an EP the unem-
ployed has to continue job search and must accept any suitable job offer (a job would not be considered
suitable if it pays less than current unemployment benefits, the working conditions are unacceptable, or if
                                                          
2 The replacement ratio is reduced to 70% if the unemployed does not have dependent family members to support.
3 More details can be found in GL and in Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller (2000).
7the workplace is too far away from home). Formally, the organiser of the employment programme acts as
the employer and the participant as an employee (but the organiser cannot “hire” the employees, they are
selected by the placement office). Duration of the programme (usually 6 months), the wage and the social
security contributions are regulated in a temporary work contract between the organiser and the worker. In
particular, the organiser has to send a monthly payroll account to both the employee and the placement
office. The participant is paid by the placement office. The wage has to be no less than the minimum wage
set for the region and sector (if there is a collective wage agreement). It may exceed the level of the
unemployment benefits, but in practice this is rather an exception. For the placement office there are no
direct savings by placing an unemployed into EP. In 1998, roughly 17'000 persons participated in an
employment programme (about 10% of the registered job seekers).
Swiss employment programmes are pretty similar to employment programmes in Germany. Other similar
programmes are also operated in several other European countries. As in the Swiss case these types of
programmes – if used at all – are usually an important part of the active labour market policy of that spe-
cific country.
Subsidised Temporary jobs (TEMP)
The immediate objective of the subsidised temporary jobs programme is to encourage job seekers to
accept job offers for “unsuitable” jobs (they pay less than their unemployment benefits) by overcompen-
sating the difference with additional payments from the UI system. The income generated by this scheme
is larger than unemployment benefits in case of not accepting the temporary job.5 Thus this programme is
financially attractive for both the unemployed and the placement office. If the accumulated duration of
temporary jobs within the entitlement period exceeds 12 months the unemployed becomes eligible for
another 2-year entitlement period. However, insured earnings (to which the replacement ratio is applied
to) are related to the wage earned in the temporary job which is below 80% of previous insured earnings
(thus combining many such spells of TEMP would lead to a consistent decline in income). Mean duration
of these temporary jobs is roughly 4 months, but there is considerable variation. The wording of the law
regulating TEMP is not very specific. Rehiring laid-off workers in TEMP jobs by the same firm is usually
not possible. But using TEMP as a subsidised screening device for firms is not ruled out and obviously
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 This so-called “three party commission” has the authority to decide whether an employment programme should be
considered to be in competition with the private sector. It acts upon complaints by the private sector.
5 The compensation payment is the replacement ratio applied to the difference between the earnings in the
temporary job and the previous earnings which will always be larger than the difference between the
unemployment benefit and the earnings in the temporary job. At the same time the unemployment insurance
system 'saves money' by always paying less than the regular unemployment benefits.
8sometimes endorsed by the placement offices in order to improve job matches. However, TEMP jobs are
not explicitly expected to become permanent after the subsidy runs out.6
Although TEMP is not part of the ALMP, roughly 20% (1998) of the unemployed participated at some
point in TEMP. Bauer, Baumann, and Künzi (1999) report that only about 20% of the jobs in TEMP are
arranged by the placement office. Employer and employee have a regular temporary work contract defin-
ing the conditions of the job (mainly duration of the contract, wage and contributions to future pensions).
The wage cannot be below the above mentioned minimum wage. Since the wage has to be less than 80%
of previous earnings (the unemployment benefit) to be eligible for a subsidised temporary job, many jobs
in TEMP are below the qualification level of the unemployed.
OECD (1996) states concerns that TEMP may lead to distortions in the labour market if it is not tightly
monitored. For example, workers might be laid-off and recalled in the TEMP scheme. Furthermore, firms
might use TEMP to avoid the dismissal protection rules to increase the flexibility of their work force, or
TEMP might be used to avoid the wage levels set in collective wage bargaining agreements. However, so
far there appears to be no evidence of abuse of TEMP in these respects.
An important feature of subsidised temporary jobs compared to EP is that TEMP is  not part of the official
ALMP (probably for historical reasons). Thus, places provided by TEMP are not counted towards the
minimum of ALMP places to be filled per canton. It is also important to recognise that the main difference
between TEMP and EP is the type of job and work experience they generate. Ignoring any potential mar-
ket distortions and assuming that EP does not produce public goods to a considerable extent, then from the
point of view of the taxpayer EP is more expensive than TEMP. An interesting question we look at with
our data is whether these programmes are systematically used by case workers in the labour office for
different groups of people (case workers fully control access to EP, but only approve of participation in
TEMP).
Arrangements subsidising jobs within firms competing in the market that are not expected to become per-
manent are not commonly used in European active labour market policies. One programme that is similar
to TEMP is the Targeted Wage Subsidies scheme introduced 1996 in Canada. It is an employer based
subsidy. A maximum of 60% of the wage is paid up to 78 weeks. Similar to the Swiss case the main goal
of this programme is to offer work experience, not necessarily continuing employment, to the unem-
ployed.
                                                          
6 The original intention of policymakers was twofold: on the one hand there was the belief that working is better
than not working, hence the provision of temporary jobs for the unemployed. On the other hand, the intention was
to provide firms with a flexible workforce for temporary jobs, for which otherwise no suitable labour supply is
available.
93 Why and for whom should these programmes work?
The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question whether and why the subsidised temporary job
programme could be superior to the employment programme as indicated by previous results. In the fol-
lowing we discuss three main reasons why the different programmes may have different effects: a) human
capital, b) signalling and stigma, c) improved job matching.
Human capital
Both programmes do not incorporate explicit training, except for on-the-job training. Bell, Blundell and
van Reenen (1999) show that the only way that a temporary subsidy can have a permanent effect on the
employability of low-skilled unemployed is to raise their productivity through work experience in the
programme. It is possible that both programmes do have this effect on productivity. However, given the
institutional differences it is possible that employment programmes generate human capital that is less
valued by potential employers due to the requirement that these jobs have to be “extraordinary” and not in
competition with “real” jobs. Furthermore, being a real job TEMP may have stronger effects on “soft”
human capital such as important contacts and references, which can be very helpful in finding permanent
jobs. This effect will be especially strong when the potential permanent job is in the same sector as the
subsidised temporary job.
Signalling
Subsidised temporary jobs are often below the qualification of the unemployed (they usually pay less than
unemployment benefits which are only 80% of previous earnings). Hence, it may be argued that human
capital effects cannot be strong. However, it is possible that the programmes have a signalling value to
employers. Because the subsidised temporary jobs are “real” jobs the employer may use this information
to conclude that participants in TEMP are better in the sense of having a closer attachment to the labour
force. The signal is especially valuable when the potential permanent job is in the same sector as the sub-
sidised temporary job. In order to be a credible signal temporary subsidised jobs must be more costly to
find for less productive workers. Since these jobs are limited and usually arranged by the unemployed
themselves, hence requiring additional search efforts, this requirement appears to be fulfilled.
Signalling may also occur in terms of stigma effects. Suppose employment programmes are stigmatised in
the sense that there is a common belief among employers that participants in employment programmes are
on average less productive than their counterparts in subsidised temporary jobs. If the unemployed know
this, more productive unemployed self-select themselves into the temporary subsidised jobs programme.
There is anecdotal evidence that employment programmes indeed carry the described stigma. Given this,
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all unemployed would want to participate in TEMP, but again finding a subsidised temporary job is more
costly for less productive unemployed.
Improved job matching
Firms may use TEMP as a subsidised screening device. Hiring new workers is costly and involves uncer-
tainty about the quality of the applicants, especially when they come from unemployment. TEMP reduces
these costs and uncertainties. Similarly, the unemployed may use TEMP to gain knowledge about poten-
tial new employers or even new occupations. Taken together, these strategies may improve the matching
process on the low-skill labour market. It is unlikely that EP will have a similar effect.
Discussion of the resulting effect heterogeneity
It is not possible to derive strict tests for the relative importance of these explanations. Nevertheless, we
can think of hypotheses about effect heterogeneity for different groups of unemployed that are plausible
under some explanations and not plausible under others. Examining the empirical evidence for these hy-
potheses may indicate some answers to the question why programmes have different effects. Our strategy
is to use nonparticipation in any programme as a benchmark because nonparticipation will have neither
human capital nor lock-in effects. Different effects with respect to nonparticipation for different groups of
unemployed may give some indication on why and for whom the two programmes TEMP and EP work.
Assume for the sake of the following arguments that if human capital is generated by one of the program-
mes it is by replacing already lost or preserving human capital due to ongoing unemployment. Consider
the expected effects of employment programmes and subsidised temporary employment compared to
nonparticipation for unemployed with a short unemployment spell. For this group, we expect the human
capital effects of the programme to be negligible.7 On the other hand, lock-in effects are particularly
strong for this group because at the beginning of the unemployment spell the job offer arrival rate is rela-
tively high. Hence, if a programme has a positive effect with respect to nonparticipation it should be
primarily due to a signal. On the other hand, for the long term unemployed we expect human capital ef-
fects and much weaker lock-in effects. Signalling may be important as well but it is not possible to disen-
tangle the reasons for the estimated effects.
Next we consider effect heterogeneity with respect to the skill level of the unemployed. This is the case
where the signalling models of McCormick (1990) and Ma and Weiss (1993) are most appropriate in our
setting. Ma and Weiss (1993) show that in case of job loss it may be better to become unemployed than to
take up a low-skill job. Taking up a low-skill (“lousy”) job may be seen as a bad signal by future employ-
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ers. A similar argument is made in McCormick (1990). Most subsidised temporary jobs and temporary
employment are below the qualification of the unemployed. In this case the theoretical models imply that
for the better qualified unemployed it is optimal not to take up such a job because it would be a negative
signal to do so. Hence we should find negative effects with respect to nonparticipation when signalling is
important. For those with relatively low earnings (and presumably productivity), on the other hand, this
negative signalling effect should not be important. Any effects we find could be due to human capital or
signalling, where the signalling effect is different from the one above. It may be positive for TEMP (the
unemployed shows motivation) and negative for EP (stigma). A similar argument applies to qualification
measured by the case worker’s evaluation of the chances to find a job.
To understand which group of unemployed should be expected in which programme, it is instructive to
compare the different incentive structures generated by the two programmes for the direct actors, namely
the unemployed as well as the local placement office. From the point of view of the latter it is obvious that
subsidised temporary jobs are attractive. The direct costs are lower and they do not require assignment
efforts as they are in many cases found by the unemployed. The case workers basic strategy appears to be
to wait and see whether the unemployed finds a regular job quickly. If the unemployed finds neither a
regular nor a subsidised temporary job the case worker tries to find a suitable programme. Again, our in-
formal interviews suggest that the unemployed are sent to employment programmes when nothing else
seems to be appropriate. As already mentioned, sometimes employment programmes are also used as a
test for the willingness to work. This behaviour is indicative of a rather bad reputation the employment
programmes may have with potential employers. Another reason to send unemployed to employment
programmes is the requirement that each canton has to fulfil its quota of programme places (c.f. Section
2).
For the unemployed the situation is more complicated. The above considerations suggest the following
pattern: at the beginning of the unemployment spell it is not optimal to do low skill jobs while looking for
an adequate job, especially for better qualified unemployed. In addition, an indirect effect of participating
in a programme could be a reduction in job search activities and job offers from the placement office
compared to nonparticipants. The unemployed with good chances to find a job will want to avoid this. Af-
ter some time in unemployment, however, it can become optimal to search for a temporary job. However,
the fact that the majority of subsidised temporary jobs is arranged by the unemployed herself suggests that
a search effort is needed to get into this programme. This in turn implies that it is costly for the unem-
ployed to find these programmes. Both human capital and the signalling explanations of the effects imply
that this cost is only taken when the expected return is higher. Another incentive to enter the temporary
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 It is well known from the research on duration dependence and hysteresis that one effect of ongoing
unemployment is an increasing depreciation of human capital.
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subsidised job programme is job shopping of the unemployed. In other words, the unemployed uses the
subsidised jobs to improve his chances of a good job match.
How will these considerations affect the composition of the participants in both programmes? In fact, it
seems that nobody has an incentive to get into an employment programme (except for case workers in
order to fulfil their quota). The described strategy of the case workers suggests that participants in em-
ployment programmes have a relatively long unemployment duration when they enter the programme.
Unemployed with sanctions regarding their benefit already imposed in the past may also end up in em-
ployment programmes, given that these are sometimes used as a test for the willingness to work. Further-
more, we would expect the unemployed with low skills and low chances to find a job to be overrepre-
sented in the employment programme because it is difficult for them to find subsidised temporary jobs.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data base
Our empirical analysis is based on two matched sources of administrative data that have already been used
by GL. By the usual international standards for observational evaluation studies, this data set is exception-
ally informative. The first data source is the information system for placement and labour market statistics
(AVAM) and the unemployment offices payment systems (ASAL). We have data from January 1996 to
December 1999 for everybody who is registered as unemployed on December 31, 1997. These data pro-
vide detailed information about the unemployment history, ALMP participation and personal charac-
teristics. For a random subsample of about 30'000 observations we obtained the social security records for
the period 1988-1999. The merged sample contains information on the individual labour market histories
and earnings on a monthly basis for 10 years prior to the current unemployment spell. In addition we have
detailed information concerning several aspects: socio-demographics (age, gender, marital status, native
language, nationality, type of work permit, language skills), region (town/village and labour office in
charge), subjective valuations of the placement officer (qualifications, chances to find job), sanctions im-
posed by the placement office; previous job and desired job (occupation, sector, position, earnings, full- /
part-time), and a short history of labour market status on a daily basis. Particularly the subjective
valuations of the placement officers and the benefit sanctions can be informative since they capture char-
acteristics like motivation and personal appearance that are usually unobservable.
Compared to GL there are important extensions to the data. We now have social security data for the years
1998 and 1999 which allows us to construct additional and more precise outcome variables for employ-
ment and earnings on a monthly basis. In GL the most important outcome variable used to measure the ef-
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fects of the programme was leaving unemployment towards employment as recorded in the unemployment
register. Now, we measure employment by the entries in the social security data. Hence, we construct
variables measuring the quality of employment in terms of earnings and to some extent job duration. This
allows us to address the question whether specific programmes lead to types of employment that may be
of lower "quality" than the job prior to the current unemployment spell. Furthermore, we evaluate the
effects on earnings per se. Given the new data we evaluate the effects up to 24 months after the pro-
grammes start. More details on the data can be found in Appendix A.
4.2 The definition of programmes used in the empirical analysis
We differentiate four groups of ALMP participation states to which we allocate all observations. Since we
are not interested in courses per se we aggregated the 16 different training courses into one broad group.
Employment programmes are not differentiated according to whether they are offered by public or private
institutions as in GL, because our earlier study found no systematic differences of the effects of these two
similar forms of employment programmes. The third programme category covers participants in
subsidised temporary jobs, and the final (comparison) group consists of those who did not participate in
any major programme between January and December 1998.8 A major programme is defined as having a
duration of at least two weeks. Following the arguments in GL we evaluate only the first major pro-
gramme starting between January and December 1998 (see that paper for details).9
For the group of nonparticipants important time varying variables like 'unemployment duration prior to the
programme' are not defined. To make meaningful comparisons to those unemployed entering a pro-
gramme, we use an approach suggested in Lechner (2002b): For each nonparticipant a hypothetical pro-
gramme starting date is predicted by relevant information available in Dec, 1997. Persons with predicted
starting date later than their actual exit date from unemployment are excluded from the data set.
4.3 The sample
We apply a series of sample selection rules to the data. Full details are given in Appendix A.1. The most
important selection criteria are that we consider only individuals unemployed (without any other part-time
job) on Dec 31, 1997 with an unemployment spell at that time of less than 12 months who have not par-
ticipated in any major programme in 1997 and who are between 25 and 55 years old. The reasons for these
selection criteria are that -given the two-year entitlement period- we want to make sure that there is suffi-
                                                          
8 The reason not to consider programmes starting before 1998 is that the data does not contain sufficient
information on the type and the duration of programmes prior to 1998. Comprehensive coverage of labour market
programmes in the official statistics was only introduced in 1998.
9 In practice this approach is less restrictive than it appears. Only about 30% of all participants enter a second
programme, and the majority of these successive programs are of the same type as the first programme.
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cient time left to participate in a programme after December 31, 1997. Furthermore, since our focus is on
the first programme we exclude those who participated in a major programme before 1998. In addition
given the variety of options for the young (schooling) and the older unemployed (early retirement) we
exclude them from our analysis. The final data set has 18’354 observations. For detailed descriptive sta-
tistics the interested reader is referred to Table A.3 in Appendix A. 10
4.4 Descriptive comparison of programme groups
Table 1 shows selected descriptive statistics to compare participant groups in the different programmes.
Our main interest is the comparison of employment programmes and subsidised temporary jobs; the se-
lected variables show significant differences between the two groups of participants. Our previous argu-
ments in Section 3 were based on two central attributes: skill level and unemployment duration. The
participants in employment programmes are clearly the least skilled, measured by the chances to find a
job, qualification, job position, and previous earnings. For the other two groups there are hardly any dif-
ferences, with the exception of the chances to find a job which are favourable for the participants of the
subsidised temporary job programme. Unemployment spell duration at the time of programme start is
almost three months larger for participants in employment programmes reflecting case workers’ tendency
to send unemployed to these programmes when no other programme seems to be adequate. Hence, the
numbers support our expectations derived from the above discussions: we find significantly more low
skilled unemployed in employment programmes, and subsidised temporary jobs take place earlier in the
unemployment spell. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that there is a limited supply of temporary
jobs. The low skilled may have problems finding them and after some time the case workers allocate them
to employment programmes. Furthermore, there is obvious regional and occupational heterogeneity in the
composition of participants in the programmes. The political structure of Switzerland gives the cantons a
considerable degree of autonomy. They may put different emphasis on the various programmes in their
local implementation of the national ALMP. 11
                                                          
10 Compared to GL the number of participants in TEMP is larger. This is due to a change in the definition of a major
programme in the case of TEMP. In the earlier study the proportion of the time spent in TEMP relative to the
month was set to 66% in order to be counted as a month in TEMP; In this study we reduced this threshold to 50%.
11 This is of course only a rough descriptive comparison, not a complete analysis of the participants structure. The
results of a multinomial probit for the selection procedure used in a later stage to estimate propensity scores can
be found in Appendix B.
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Table 1: Number of observations and selected characteristics of different programme groups
Group Subsidised
temporary job
(TEMP)
Employment
programmes (EP)
Nonparticipation
(NONP)
Obs. (persons) 5365 2107 5461
Pre-programme characteristics
Chances to find a job good or very good 23 18 22
difficult or special case
(share in %)
13 24 18
Qualification (mean) 1.74 1.87 1.73
Job position very low 37 47 36
High 5 3 7
Unemployment duration before programme (mean days) 222 303 218
Female 41 38 43
Nationality  foreign with yearly permit 15 18 16
foreign with permanent permit 31 29 31
Swiss 54 53 53
Earnings before unemployment (mean per month in CHF) 3970 3660 3950
Region Zurich 18 17 22
West 21 29 16
Eastern 10 7 9
Central 5 7 5
South-west 28 22 30
North-west 11 9 9
Post-programme outcomes
Earnings Sept. 1999 (if employed) (mean in CHF) 3672 3279 3702
Employed Sept. 1999 (share  in %) 72 58 59
Note: Qualification is measured as skilled (1), semiskilled (2), and unskilled (3).
Comparing the outcomes of the participants in the programmes we find that earnings in September 1999
are almost identical for nonparticipants and participants in temporary subsidised job, but lower for par-
ticipants in employment programmes. The employment share is on a similar level for all programmes ex-
cept for temporary wage subsidies where it is more than ten percentage points higher. Of course, these
figures for the outcome variables cannot be interpreted as the causal effects of the programmes.
5 Econometrics
We base our analysis of the prototypical model of the microeconometric evaluation literature with multi-
ple treatments: An individual chooses between several states, like participation in an employment pro-
gramme or non-participation in such a programme. The potential participant in a programme gets an hypo-
thetical outcome (e.g. earnings) in both states. This model is based on the binary potential outcome model
(Roy, 1951, Rubin, 1974) extended by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) to multiple, mutually exclusive
states. Here, we consider outcomes of four different states denoted by 0 1 2 3{ , , , }Y Y Y Y . The different
states are called treatments in the following to stick to the terminology of that literature. For any individ-
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ual, only one component of 0 1 2 3{ , , , }Y Y Y Y  is observable. Participation in a particular treatment m is
indicated by the realisation of the random variable S, {0,1,2,3}S . This notation allows us under the usual
assumptions (see Rubin, 1974) to define average treatment effects for pair-wise comparisons of the effects
of different states:
 0
m l m l m lE Y Y EY EY, ( )    ; (1)
 0
m l m l m lE Y Y S m E Y S m E Y S m, ( | ) ( | ) ( | )       ;      ; , {0,1,2,3}m l m l  . (2)
 0
m l,  denotes the expected (average) effect of treatment m relative to treatment l for a participant drawn
randomly from the population (average treatment effect, ATE).12 ATE’s are symmetric ( 0
m l,  =  0
l m, ).
 0
m l,  is the expected effect for an individual randomly drawn from the population of participants in treat-
ment m only (ATE on the treated, ATET). ATET’s are not symmetric, if participants in treatments m and l
differ in a way that is related to the distribution of X, and if the treatment effects vary with X.
5.1 Identification
ATE’s and ATET’s are generally not identified so that additional assumptions are needed. We already
noted that our data compiled from different administrative records are so rich that it seems plausible to
assume that we observe all important factors that jointly influence labour market outcomes and the process
selecting people into the four different states. Therefore, we assume that treatment participation and
treatment outcome is independent conditional on a set of (observable) attributes (conditional independence
assumption, CIA). CIA defined to be valid in a subspace  of the attribute space is formalised in
expression (3):
Y Y Y S X x xM0 1, ,..., | ,    . (3)
This assumption requires the researcher to observe all characteristics that jointly influence the outcomes as
well as selection into treatments. In addition CIA requires that all individuals that are part of the evalua-
tion could participate in all states (i.e. 0 ( | )P S m X x   , 0,...,3m  , x   ).
Equation (3) postulates that conditional on the observable attributes there remains no systematic selection
on unobservables. In other words there are no exogenous variables left out that are both correlated with
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potential outcomes and the participation decision. Candidates for such unobservables include variables
like motivation, ability, and personal appearance. Our unusually informative data allows us to capture the
major effects of these unobservables. For example, motivation can be measured by sanctions imposed by
the placement office as well as by the employment history in the past ten years. Unobserved ability is
captured by past earnings, and specific labour-related problems can be measured by past employment
profiles (repeated movement between labour market states). Of particular importance is the variable
“chances to find a job”, which is a subjective judgement by the placement officer. This judgement is based
on interviews and the impressions the placement officer obtains in his interviews in the beginning of the
unemployment spell. This variable should capture characteristics like motivation and personal appearance
that are usually unobservable. After controlling for this wealth of information there should be little
unobserved heterogeneity left that is systematically correlated with labour market outcomes and pro-
gramme participation. For detailed arguments about identification the reader is referred to GL.
5.2 A matching estimator
Lechner (2001) shows that CIA identifies all effects defined in this section and that expression (3) implies
independence not only conditional on X but also conditional on the marginal probabilities of the states
(conditional on X), denoted by 0 1 2 3[ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )]P X P X P X P X .13 Based on this insight, Lechner (2001,
2002a, b) propose and apply different matching estimators for that problem. Here we use the version
implemented in the paper by GL (see Table 2 for details).
Several comments are in order: A discussion of the implementation as well as the results of the simulated
maximum likelihood estimator of the multinomial probit model used in Step 1 is given in Appendix B.
Step 2 ensures that we estimate only effects in regions of the attribute space where two observations from
two treatments could be observed having a similar participation probability.14 Otherwise the estimator will
give biased results (see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, Todd, 1998). In total the common support criteria
discarded only about 3.5% of the observations (see Appendix C for details).
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 If a variable Z cannot be changed by the effect of the treatment then all what follows is also valid in strata of the
data defined by different values of Z.
13 Depending on the effect to be estimated we need to condition only on a subset or of functions of these
probabilities. For all details the reader is referred to Lechner (2001).
14 This condition is also called the 'common-support requirement'. Note that if we would only be interested in pair-
wise effects the current implementation would be unnecessarily strict, since making sure that there is an overlap
for each pair would be sufficient. Our implementation has the advantage that we evaluate all programmes on the
same support.
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Table 2: A matching protocol for the estimation of ,0
m l
  and ,0
m l

Step 1 Specify and estimate a multinomial probit model to obtain 0 1 3 4ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )]N N N NP x P x P x P x .
Step 2 Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the smallest
maximum and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by S.
Step 3 Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables.
For a given value of m and l the following steps are performed:
a) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by participation in m and delete it from that
pool.
b) Find an observation in the subsample of participants in l that is as close as possible to the one
chosen in step a) in terms of ˆ ˆ[ ( ), ( )]m lN NP x P x . 'Closeness' is based on the Mahalanobis distance.
Do not remove that observation, so that it can be used again.
c) Repeat a) and b) until no participant in m is left.
d) Using the matched comparison group formed in c), compute the respective conditional expectation
by the sample mean. Note that the same observations may appear more than once in that group.
Step 4 Repeat Step 3 for all combinations of m and l.
Step 5 Compute estimates of treatment effects using the results of Step 4 by means in matched samples.
Note: Lechner (2001) suggests an estimator of the asymptotic standard errors for ,ˆm lN and 
,ˆm l
N  conditional on the estimated
probabilities in Step 1.
A third remark about the matching algorithm concerns the fact that the same comparison observation is
used repeatedly in forming the comparison group (matching with replacement). This modification of the
'standard' estimator (which means increasing the variance by reducing the bias) is necessary for the
estimator to be applicable at all when the number of participants in treatment m is larger than in the com-
parison treatment l. Since the role of m and l could be reversed in this framework, this is always the case
when the number of participants is not equal in all treatments. For the sake of brevity we do not document
the matching quality explicitly. Similarly to the already mentioned previous studies this estimator roughly
balances the covariates in an appropriate way.
6 Empirical estimates of the effects
6.1 Measurement of the outcomes in the labour market
According to Swiss legislation the primary objective of the active labour market policy is to increase the
reemployment probabilities. At least implicitly, the idea is also that the new job should be at least of
similar quality as the previous one. We combine the two data sources to develop indicators that proxy
these objectives. We compute indicators of successful employment from the social security data by using
information whether there are payments from employment that can be related to a particular month. We
define an employment spell as successful if it has a duration of at least 3 months. In addition we create an
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indicator that measures the quality of employment (continuously employed for at least 3 months with
earnings at least 90% of earnings in the previous job). Furthermore, as a crude proxy for individual pro-
ductivity we include gross earnings coded as zero when an individual is not employed in the regular la-
bour market. We also compute the months of unemployment within the next 12 months to get a measure
on how many months of unemployment programme participation may save within a year. A final outcome
variable (seeking a job) is based on the information whether somebody is registered with the labour office
as job seeker. This outcome variable will pick up the institutional feature that subsidised temporary jobs
can extend the unemployment benefit eligibility period. Thus the incentive to remain registered with the
labour office is larger compared to other programmes, which do not affect the two-year eligibility period.15
Table A.2 in Appendix A describes the outcome variables more precisely. Table A.3 shows descriptive
statistics.
We measure the effects of a programme in the month after the programme started (with simulated begin-
ning dates for nonparticipants, see Section 4.2). In case an individual is known to be informed about pro-
gramme participation prior to the month of the actual start of the programme we use this month of infor-
mation as start date, because a programme may have an effect on individual behaviour from the very mo-
ment when an individual knows that she will participate. Furthermore, focusing on the begin of the pro-
gramme rules out that programmes appear to be successful, just because they keep their participants busy
by making them stay in the programme. We consider a programme to be most successful if everybody
would leave for employment (of 'good' quality) immediately after she is informed about future participa-
tion. We must emphasise that whenever a person participates in any of the programmes she is considered
as registered unemployed (and not employed) in the definition of all outcome variables.
For programmes starting in January 1998 we measure outcome variables for 23 months (2/1998-12/1999)
or 12 months for the accumulated measures. However, since the evaluated programmes may start between
Jan. 1998 and Dec. 1998, only 12 months of nonaccumulated outcomes are observable for everybody.
Since a large share of the programmes started in the first quarter of 1998, for most observations we meas-
ure the effects for at least 18 months. When interpreting the result we should also keep in mind that the
economy came out of the 1997 recession fairly quickly in 1998 and particularly in 1999 leading to a drop
in the unemployment rate from 5.0% in December 1997 (share of unemployment spells longer than 1 year:
33%) to 2.5% in December 1999 (21%).
                                                          
15 It is possible to remain registered when the eligibility period is over, but of course there will be no more unem-
ployment benefits.
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6.2 Mean effects of programmes for their participants
Table 3 shows the means of the outcomes in the various groups, the estimated counterfactual expectations
and pair-wise comparisons between the subsidy programmes and between the programmes and nonpar-
ticipation. For the sake of brevity COURSES are omitted because their effects are not central to this paper.
Furthermore, we concentrate on three outcome variables: employment during at least 3 consecutive
months generating on average more than 90% of previous monthly earnings, average monthly earnings,
and the number of additional unemployment over the next 12 months. For the first two outcomes we pre-
sent results 3, 9, 15 and 21 months after the begin of the programme, for the third outcome that is based on
accumulating effects over the 12 months ahead, we present effects 1 and 6 months after the start. Column
(3) and (4) give the exact sample sizes (after imposing common support) available at each point of (proc-
ess) time. Note that sample sizes fall after month 12 (the last month observed is month 24, programme
participation starts between month 1 and 12). Thus, the population changes somewhat after month 12 in
the sense that, for example, the estimate for month 23 is entirely based on individuals entering the pro-
gramme in January 1998. Therefore, the precision of the estimates falls as well, which is reflected in the
estimated standard errors increasing after month 12.
Columns (5) and (8) show the mean outcomes for the participants in programme one (5) as well as the
mean outcomes for participants in programme zero (8). Column (6) shows the estimated mean counter-
factual outcome of treatment one for population zero. Column (7) shows the respective estimated mean
counterfactual outcome of treatment zero for population one. In general, all variables are increasing be-
cause more and more of the unemployed find jobs the longer the duration of unemployment (and only a
few return to unemployment), which is not surprising given the economic upswing during 1998 and 1999.
Nevertheless the pattern of the increase varies considerably between different treatments and different
populations. The variation in earnings (coded as zero if the individual is not employed in the first labour
market) is largely driven by the variation in employment status.
The comparison of column (5) to column (6) and of column (8) to column (7) reveals the magnitude of the
selection bias corrected for by the estimation procedure. It is interesting to note that the selection bias
would be largest in the comparison of EP and NONP and relatively modest in the comparisons involving
TEMP. The comparisons clearly show that the unemployed in EP have the worst labour market perspec-
tives in all potential states. From these estimates the estimated mean effects of two different states for
participants in treatment 1 and 0 can be directly computed. These estimates and the corresponding as-
ymptotic standard errors are given in columns (9) to (12). Columns (13) and (14) show the effects for the
joint population of participants (TEMP, EP, courses) and the nonparticipants. When bold, effects are sig-
nificant at the 1% level, when in italics they are significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3: Estimates of effects
Sample sizeOut-
come
Month
after
begin 1 0
1( |E Y
| 1)S 
1( |E Y
| 0)S 
0( |E Y
| 1)S 
0( |E Y
| 0)S 
1,0
ˆN Std.
err.
0,1
ˆ N Std.
err.
1,0
ˆ N Std.
err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Subsidised temporary job (1) compared to employment programme (0)
EWEL 3 5182 2085 17 15 9 8 8 1.2 8 1.3 7 1.1
in % 9 5182 2085 29 26 20 18 9 1.7 7 1.6 7 1.5
15 4846 1889 42 39 33 30 9 2.1 9 1.9 7 1.8
21 2925 778 45 43 38 34 7 3.2 8 2.9 7 2.6
EARN 3 1154 921 580 415 574 56 506 65 552 52
in 9 1832 1609 1213 1022 618 81 587 78 528 72
CHF 15 2491 2217 2073 1808 418 96 409 89 331 84
21 2716 2405 2421 2179 295 148 226 135 188 123
UE in 1-12 5182 2085 5.8 6.0 7.4 7.5 -1.6 0.2 -1.5 0.2 -1.7 0.1
months 6-17 4505 1640 3.9 3.9 4.8 4.8 -0.9 0.2 -0.9 0.2 -1.1 0.2
Subsidised temporary job (1) compared to nonparticipation (0)
EWEL 3 5182 5225 17 15 19 19 -2 1.1 -4 1.1 -2 0.9
in % 9 5182 5225 29 27 27 25 2 1.3 2 1.2 3 1.1
15 4846 5097 42 40 34 33 8 1.4 7 1.4 8 1.2
21 2925 3921 45 43 38 35 7 1.7 7 1.6 8 1.5
EARN 3 1154 1048 1244 1163 -90 59 -116 54 -58 49
in 9 1832 1799 1734 1633 98 67 166 61 193 55
CHF 15 2491 2348 2148 2055 343 73 293 66 359 60
21 2716 2601 2411 2211 305 85 389 79 359 73
UE in 1-12 5182 5173* 5.8 5.9 4.7 5.1 1.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.1
months 6-17 4505 4987 3.9 3.8 2.8 3.0 1.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.1
Employment programme (1) compared to nonparticipation (0)
EWEL 3 2085 5225 8 8 13 19 -6 1.5 -10 1.4 -9 1.1
in % 9 2085 5225 18 22 20 25 -1 1.7 -4 1.9 -4 1.5
15 1889 5097 30 32 27 33 3 2.0 -1 2.3 1 1.8
21 778 3921 34 37 29 35 6 2.7 1 3.0 1 2.6
EARN 3 415 528 796 1163 -381 76 -635 63 -610 54
in 9 1022 1273 1231 1633 -209 91 -359 91 -334 74
CHF 15 1808 2014 1621 2055 187 103 -40 106 28 87
21 2179 2436 1849 2211 330 137 225 143 170 122
UE in 1-12 2085 5173 7.5 7.7 5.3 5.1 2.2 0.2 2.6 0.2 2.6 0.1
months 6-17 1640 4987 4.8 5.0 3.0 3.0 1.8 0.2 2.0 0.2 2.0 0.2
Note: EWEL: Employed for at least 3 months with average earnings of more than 90% of previous earnings. EARN: Monthly
gross earnings in employment with minimum duration of 3 months. UE: Months of registered unemployment in 12
months period. Results are based on matched samples (see Table 3). Bold numbers indicate significance at the 1%
level (2-sided test), numbers in italics indicate significance at the 5% level. Results for COURSES are available on re-
quest. * 52 nonparticipants have a simulated starting date of Jan 1999.
The estimated effects show that TEMP is the superior programme. About 15 months after the begin of the
programme we find a more or less stable and significant positive employment effect of participating in
TEMP of about 7-9% points compared to EP and NONP. There does not appear to be too much variation
of this effect between different populations defined by treatment status. Similarly, there is an average
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earnings gain after 15 months of about 300-400 CHF. Comparing both programmes to nonparticipation
reveals a particular shape: negative effects appear in the beginning that eventually get positive and signifi-
cant. In the medium run it seems that both programmes increase the employment probabilities for their
participants by about 6-7% points. However, even for the participants in EP it would have been more
beneficial to enter TEMP instead. This view is confirmed when considering the accumulated effects: Par-
ticipating in TEMP instead of EP reduces registered unemployment by about one month per year. For
reasons already discussed in section 6.1, in comparison to nonparticipation both programmes increase
unemployment benefit duration by about 1 (TEMP) to 2 months (EP) per year in the time immediately
after the start of the programme.
Before returning to the dynamic shape of the effects in more detail, it is instructive to get an idea about the
magnitude of earnings. If we assume that those not working would receive the mean earnings of those
working, we are able to compute counterfactual earnings for the employed in all states by dividing the
earnings displayed in Table 3 by the employment probability. Earnings computed that way (Table 4)
suggest that the effects presented in Table 3 are mainly driven by employment effects. For example, for
participants in TEMP the difference between potential earnings in TEMP and in EP is CHF 121 (treatment
effect 15 months after programme start). Based on the different definition of the earnings variable (coded
0 for nonemployed), the corresponding treatment effect in Table 3 is 418, because it also includes an
effect on employment. However, these numbers have to be interpreted with care because the assumption
used to compute them is not very convincing: there may be considerable selection going on (of another
type that the one already corrected for) due to different groups of unemployed entering employment at
different times for different treatments. Furthermore, the estimates may be unreliable particularly for the
smaller samples in the second year because dividing one estimated quantity by an another small estimated
quantity (between 0 and 1) may result in very imprecise estimates.
Table 4: Average potential earnings for those who would be employed
Potential outcome TEMP TEMP TEMP EP EP EP NONP NONP NONP
Population TEMP EP NONP TEMP EP NONP TEMP EP NONP
Outcome month
after
begin
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
EARN 3 3596 3320 3453 3472 3069 3579 3707 3385 3738
in 9 3574 3309 3540 3534 3230 3755 3759 3266 3768
CHF 15 3729 3418 3611 3608 3275 3627 3703 3185 3735
21 3781 3421 3674 3675 3317 3733 3791 3320 3751
Note: Estimated mean earnings divided by estimated employment probability for respective population.
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Although Table 3 already indicated the time shape of the effects, the following figures summarise the
dynamics of the effects by showing their development over time after the start of the programme on a
monthly base (if significant at the 5% level). Note again that the sample sizes decrease after 12 months.
The sample is probably large enough to estimate the effects for about 21 months after the start of a pro-
gramme with sufficient precision.
Figure 1: Dynamics of average effects for participants in TEMP compared to EP, COURSES, and NONP
after the start of the programme
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Fig. 1a: Employment with duration   3 months
Months after start
Fig. 1b: Searching for a job
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Fig. 1c: Earnings in employment   3 months
Months after start
Fig. 1d: Employment without earnings loss
Months after start
Note: NONP: Nonparticipation; EP Employment programme; TEMP: Subsidised temporary job. Start dates for nonparticipants
are simulated. Only estimated effects that are significant at the 5% level (two-sided test) are reported.
Figures 1 and 2 display the estimates of the effects of TEMP (compared to the other states) for participants
in TEMP (Figure 1) as well as the effects of EP for the participants in EP (Figure 2) for 4 different out-
come variables. A line above zero indicates that TEMP has a positive employment effect, or a positive
effect on the probability to be registered as searching, respectively, relative to the programme associated
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with that particular line. Only effects significant at the 5% level are displayed. Note that the effects dis-
played in Figures 1 and 2 are not symmetric because the effects are estimated for different treatment
populations.
First consider the effects of TEMP for TEMP participants (Figure 1) for the various outcome variables.
The share of unemployed finding a job with a duration of at least three months (Fig. 1a) reveals that
TEMP dominates the two other programmes. In the beginning the effect with respect to EP is above 15%
points but declines subsequently and stabilises around 5 to 7% points after 15 months. This shape may be
related to differences in the duration of the programmes. As expected there is no initial significant effect
compared to nonparticipation but the effect becomes significantly positive after 9 months. Again the effect
seems to stabilise at about 5 to 7% points.
The alternative outcome measure searching for a job (and registered with the labour office; Fig. 1b) ap-
pears to draw a more negative picture in the sense that relative to nonparticipation TEMP increases the
probability of being registered as job seeker. It is particularly worrying that after the initial negative effect
due to lock-in, it remains negative throughout. At first sight one might conclude that this finding is caused
by the particular feature of the Swiss unemployment insurance system: participation in TEMP increases
the entitlement period for unemployment benefits. However, a similar picture can be found in Figure 1b,
where we present the effect of EP relative to NONP. From this we conjecture that the entitlement
prolongation cannot be the whole story. The most plausible explanation is that nonparticipants have a sig-
nificantly larger probability of leaving the labour force (see also Table A.3 in Appendix A).
The dynamics of the earnings variable more or less mirror the dynamics of the employment variable. The
remaining variable combines earnings and employment information. The continuous positive effects of
TEMP measured by the indicator earnings without employment loss indicates that the quality of jobs gen-
erated by TEMP is not worse than for any other programme. Note, however, that the effect with respect to
EP initially is much smaller compared to Figure 1a, where we do not take account of previous earnings. If
we compare the effects of TEMP with respect to EP in Figures 1a and 1d they appear to be converging.
This suggests that part of the early success of TEMP according to Figure 1a could be due to relatively bad
and short-lived jobs.
Combined with the result for the outcome searching for a job these findings suggest that participants in
TEMP fall into two groups: those who find stable employment and those who switch between regular (but
short-lived) employment, unemployment and participation in TEMP. For this latter group there is the pos-
sibility of a TEMP career, but given that unemployment benefits fall at least every second year this cannot
be a sustainable strategy to follow. The data do not allow to analyse this possibility. From a policy
perspective it is an important finding that a programme which is subsidising below qualification jobs does
not necessarily lead to unemployed subsequently searching and accepting low quality jobs.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of average effects for participants in EP compared to TEMP, COURSES, and NONP
after the start of the programme
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Fig. 2a: Employment with duration   3 months
Months after start
Fig. 2b: Searching for a job
Months after start
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Fig. 2c: Earnings in employment   3 months
Months after start
Fig. 2d: Employment without earnings loss
Months after start
Note: See note below Figure 1.
The previous comparison between EP and TEMP for TEMP participants is confirmed when considering
the population of participants in EP (Figure 2). An interesting feature appears with respect to the compari-
son of EP with NONP. At least in the longer run there is some evidence for a positive effect of EP after
about 14 months. Although these effects are not significant throughout in Figure 1d, the fact that some of
them exist for all outcome variables (with the exception of searching for a job) does indicate that EP may
have some positive medium run effect compared to nonparticipation.16
In summary, the results presented above confirm that on average TEMP is superior to the other pro-
grammes as well as to nonparticipation. This was already found by GL to some extent, but they could not
take into account any earnings information, and they had to rely on a time horizon of no more than 15
                                                          
16 These effects have not been detected by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) because their observation period ended in
March 1999.
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months. However, this average analysis does not give any answers to the question why TEMP might work
better than EP. Therefore, the following section compares effects across subgroups of unemployed.
6.3 Heterogeneity of the effects
In Section 3 we developed a number of hypotheses about effect heterogeneity. The empirical evaluation of
these hypotheses may indicate some answers to the question why TEMP is superior.
Heterogeneity with respect to unemployment duration
Assuming that any human capital generated by the programmes is a replacement of lost human capital due
to ongoing unemployment implies that the effects of both programmes (compared to nonparticipation)
should be larger for individuals whose unemployment spell is already fairly long when they enter the pro-
gramme. Table 5 shows the effects of TEMP and EP for unemployed with less than 180 days of
unemployment before entering the programmes (left panel) as well as for unemployed with more than 270
days of unemployment (right panel). The results are compatible with our hypothesis in the sense that the
effects of both programmes with respect to nonparticipation are significantly larger for the subpopulation
with longer previous unemployment.17 For this subpopulation EP is clearly superior to NONP 10 months
after programme start, and not significantly different in the first 9 months, when the lock-in effect works
against EP. This result indicates that for the long-term unemployed doing nothing is not a good strategy.
This is strongly confirmed by the large positive effects of TEMP with respect to NONP for this
subpopulation.
For the short-term unemployed, we do not expect human capital effects, but relatively strong negative
lock-in effects compared to nonparticipation. We only find significant negative effects of EP with respect
to NONP in the period between 4 and 9 months after programme start. This result is most likely due to
lock-in effects. Given that there are no significant negative effects after 9 months casts some doubts on the
stigma story regarding EP. TEMP, on the other hand, even has positive effects after 9 months suggesting
that TEMP has positive signalling effects that cancel the negative lock-in effect in the first months after
programme start. However, it is also possible that getting a foot back into working life early on may be
helpful in finding permanent jobs. Observing a positive effect of TEMP compared to EP is also what
would be expected under the signalling and the improved job match explanations, given the assumption
that for these unemployed the programmes do not generate human capital. Note that there are significant
                                                          
17 All effects presented in this subsection are based on average treatment effects, because the theory suggest that the
results should hold for the same populations. Conditioning in addition on treatment status might in fact invalidate
the comparisons. Note also that the identity 1,2 1,0 2,0     must hold.
27
positive effects after 9 and 15 months, i.e. they should not be due to the different duration of the pro-
grammes.
Table 5: Estimates of effects (by unemployment duration) with “employment without earnings loss” as
outcome
Month after
begin
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
Short duration (less than 180 days) Long duration (more than 270 days)
TEMP (1) compared to EP (0)
3 15 14 (1) 11 7 3
9 26 16 6 26 18 7
15 39 27 7 35 27 8
21 43 33 (6) 36 32 (3)
TEMP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 15 17 (-1) 11 7 3
9 26 22 (2) 26 14 10
15 39 29 6 35 21 15
21 43 31 8 36 23 12
EP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 14 17 (-3) 7 7 (0)
9 16 22 -4 18 14 (3)
15 27 29 (-1) 27 21 7
21 33 31 (2) 32 23 9
Note: Outcome variable is employed for at least 3 months with average earnings more than 90% of previous earnings. Re-
sults are based on matched samples. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (2-sided test). Sample sizes
after correcting for common support for UE < 180: TEMP / courses / EP / NONP: 2328 / 2226 / 454 / 2293. Sample
sizes UE > 270: 1769 / 1794 / 1150 / 1804.
Heterogeneity with respect to qualification
In Section 3 we argued that (relatively) skilled unemployed should not enter either temporary employment
programme because they are overqualified for the typical job in any of these programmes. Hence for these
unemployed we should not find positive effects of the programmes with respect to nonparticipation.
Probably the best summary measures of human capital available in our data are previous earnings and the
chances to find a job. It turns out that there are no systematic differences between the results based on
these two measures.
Therefore, we concentrate on skill measured by the chance to find a job which is shown in Table 6.18 The
left panel refers to the unemployed with good a priori chances. The results with respect to nonparticipation
support our hypothesis to some extent. There is no systematic effect for either programme (except a large
negative early effect for EP, probably due to lock-in). But we do not find a negative effect of TEMP,
                                                          
18 The figures for effect heterogeneity by previous earnings are contained in Appendix D.
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which would be predicted by the signalling model. Also for this group of unemployed TEMP is clearly
superior to EP at most points in time.
For unemployed with bad a priori chances (right panel of Table 6) a completely different picture arises for
the comparison of TEMP with nonparticipation. For these unemployed TEMP is better than nonpar-
ticipation throughout the evaluation period. On the other hand, EP has a negative effect in the first seven
months compared to nonparticipation, which probably is a lock-in effect again, and no significant effect
afterwards. This result may be due to the relatively small sample size of EP participants with low employ-
ability. When me measure skills by previous earnings we find significant positive effects of EP compared
to nonparticipation after eleven months (see Table D.4 in the Appendix). The positive effect of TEMP
with respect to EP is of the same magnitude as for the high-skilled group, but significant throughout.
Table 6: Estimates of effects (by employability) with “employment without earnings loss” as outcome
Month after
begin
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
High employability Low employability
TEMP (1) compared to EP (0)
3 19 9 12 13 4 7
9 31 22 7 22 11 8
15 44 35 8 33 21 12
21 47 37 (6) 36 26 10
TEMP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 19 24 -4 13 9 (0)
9 31 31 (1) 22 15 5
15 44 41 (4) 33 18 13
21 47 41 (2) 36 21 13
EP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 9 24 -16 4 9 -7
9 22 31 -8 11 15 (-3)
15 35 41 (-4) 21 18 (1)
21 37 41 (-4) 26 21 (3)
Note: Outcome variable is employed for at least 3 months with average earnings more than 90% of previous earnings. Re-
sults are based on matched samples. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (2-sided test). Sample sizes
after correcting for common support TEMP / courses / EP / NONP for high employability: 1480 / 1158 / 471 / 1286.
Sample sizes TEMP / courses / EP / NONP for low employability: 650 / 898 / 480 / 883.
Overall, the results concerning subgroup heterogeneity mostly correspond to the hypotheses presented in
section 3. However, we do not find support for the signalling model of Ma and Weiss (1990) and the
stigma effects related to EP. We consistently find that for low-skilled and longer-term unemployed par-
ticipation in a programme is better than doing nothing, but in each case TEMP is better than EP. We can-
not attribute the positive effects to single explanations, but the results suggest that positive signals and im-
proved job matching are important.
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Appendix D contains further investigations into subgroup heterogeneity. We find that separating the sam-
ple along the line of sectors (of previous occupation) with high and low TEMP participation probabilities
does not reveal any effect heterogeneity (table D.1). The same holds true for effect heterogeneity between
women and men. Finally, considering effect heterogeneity between skilled (50% of the unemployed, due
to the specific definition of the skill variable in these data) and low skilled does not reveal major
differences. However, the latter result probably merely reflect that this measure of skill level (unskilled,
semiskilled, skilled) is too crude. This suspicion already appeared for the estimation of the participation
probabilities. In these estimations the skill level is not significant (see Section 5 and Appendix B).
We also performed another estimation on a subsample aged 35 and older (see left panel in table D.1). We
want to check if the results would change rather dramatically. This would be an indication of either effect
heterogeneity or selection problems, because for this group we typically control for 10 years for
employment history, whereas many of the group of younger unemployment enter the labour market later
so that we cannot yet observe such a long history. Nevertheless, the results appear to be very similar to
those presented in the main section of the paper.
7 Conclusion
Subsidised temporary employment is one of the tools of active labour market policies to improve the
chances of  the unemployed to find permanent employment. Using large and informative individual data
coming from various administrative sources we investigate the effects of two different schemes of subsi-
dised temporary employment in Switzerland. Concentrating on one country has the advantage of holding
the economic environment constant. The crucial difference between the two schemes is that one operates
as a non-profit employment programme, whereas the other one is a subsidy for temporary jobs in firms
operating in a competitive market. We are interested in how successful these programmes are in speeding
up the reintegration of the unemployed into work.
We find that from the point of view of the unemployed the subsidies for temporary jobs in 'normal' firms
subject to market pressure (TEMP) are superior to the 'classical' employment programmes (EP) operating
in areas without much private competition. About a year and a half after the begin of the programme,
TEMP generates additional employment of about 9%-points for its participants compared to EP. Even for
the participants in EP, TEMP would have generated about 9%-points additional employment if they had
participated in TEMP instead. Compared to EP TEMP saves about one month of UE benefits in the first
year after the start of the programmes. We generally find the programmes much less successful for
unemployed that may be characterised as the 'good-risks', whereas they tend to increase the reemployment
probabilities of 'bad risks'. However, in almost all cases TEMP is more effective than EP. Finally, we can,
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to some extent, dismiss the concerns that the gains in the chances to find a job are due to 'low-quality' jobs
taken up by TEMP participants. However, there is some evidence that some of the short-term success of
TEMP is due to a group of participants that appear to be switching between unemployment, TEMP
participation, and short-lived regular employment.
While searching for possible explanations for our findings, the fairly systematic heterogeneity of effects
between different groups of unemployed indicates evidence for positive signalling effects of TEMP (based
on the results for the short-term unemployed). Furthermore, there is also evidence for positive human
capital effects for both EP and TEMP (based on the results for low-skill unemployed). However, the
evidence in favour of or against one of the competing hypotheses is not based on strict tests, but is rather
based on compatibility of the estimated effect heterogeneity with our knowledge about programme
allocation processes as well as theoretic considerations about possible effects.
One obvious policy conclusion is that sending people with good a priori chances on the labour market into
these programmes is not cost-effective. Furthermore, it appears to be a bad idea of using these subsidy
programmes in the beginning of an unemployment spell. However, even for these groups TEMP seems to
be superior to EP. In fact we find no subpopulations for which EP is systematically superior to TEMP.
Finally, the unemployment insurance legislation in effect in 1998 requires that cantons fulfil a regional
quota of programme places they have to fill (towards which EP counts, but TEMP participation does not).
Failure to meet this requirement would have financial consequences for the cantons by reducing federal
payments to the cantonal unemployment office. This may have had fairly counterproductive effects,
especially given the recovery of the labour market that lead to a diminished pool of unemployed that had
to be allocated to the various programmes of the ALMP.
With respect to cost-effectiveness it is obvious that the direct costs of TEMP are lower than those of EP
and of nonparticipation. Given that TEMP is also the most effective programme this suggests a clear-cut
policy recommendation in favour of TEMP. However, this conclusion has to be taken with some caution,
because it ignores the potential indirect costs of both schemes. There are concerns that programmes like
TEMP may lead to substitution of unsubsidised labour through subsidised labour, i.e. they may create
unemployment. We cannot address this question with our data, but it seems unlikely that this effect is
large for a temporary programme like TEMP. The set-up of the employment programmes should prevent
crowding out unsubsidised firms. Again, we cannot deal with this problem with our data. Obviously, fu-
ture research should be directed towards this issue. Extending the sample in the future would allow to dig
dipper into these issues without having to rely on extrapolations coming from parametric functional as-
sumptions on the outcome equation.
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Appendix A: Data
The population of interest are prime age individuals who are registered as unemployed in December 31,
1997 and have some previous work experience. For these individuals we use the following data bases of
the unemployment insurance system:
 AVAM database: data generated in the regional placement offices;
personal characteristics, information about last job, duration of job search, ...
 ASAL database: data from the unemployment benefit payment system;
all payments and information about programme participation.
Table A.1: Sample Selection Rules
Subsidised
temporary
job
Courses Employment
programme
Non-
participation
Initial number of observations 7’799 7’305 2’805 12’524
Personal characteristics:
- not disabled
- previous earnings > SFr. 1000
- 24 < age < 56
- information about mother tongue is not missing
- Swiss or yearly or permanent working permit
- no seasonal workers, no home workers, no students
- unemployed and not working part-time Dec., 31, ‘97
- less than 1 year unemployed -300 -1’434 -519 -2’426
remaining observations 6’499 5’871 2’286 10’098
Programme experience criteria:
- no programme with duration > 14 days in 1997
- no employment programme in 1997
- programme does not start on January 1, 1998
  (continuing programme) -1’134 -450 -179 -789
remaining observations 5’365 5’421 2’107 9’309
Nonparticipants being not unemployed at their simulated
starting date of programme -3’848
final sample (18'354 obs.) 5’365 5’421 2’107 5’461
Note: The full sample selection process is documented in GL. Here we display only the steps that use (slightly) different se-
lection rules.
For a randomly chosen subsample (30'454 observations; about 20% of the population of interest) we have
social security data with earnings based monthly information over the past 10 years. This appendix ex-
plains the selection rules for the sample used (Table A.1), gives the definition of the outcome variables
(Table A.2), and presents descriptive statistics of explanatory (Table A.4) as well as outcome variables
(Table A.3 and Figure A.1). More detailed information about the data sources are available in GL.
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Table A.2: Description of outcome variables
a Employment with duration > 3 months Person has an earnings spell of at least 3 successive months (dummy
variable)
b Searching for a job Person is registered at the regional labor office as searching for a job
and doesn’t earn more than 3000 CHF during more than 2 successive
months at the same time (dummy variable)
c Earnings in employment > 3 months Smoothed monthly earnings in CHF in an employment spell with dura-
tion of at least 3 months
d Employment without earnings loss Person receives earnings during at least 3 successive months and the
wage exceeds 90% of the wage earned in the last employment spell
(dummy variable)
e Months of unemployment Months of registered unemployment in 12 months period
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics
Variable
Subsidised
temporary
job
Courses Employ-
ment pro-
gramme
Nonpar-
ticipation
number of observations 5’365 5’421 2’107 5’461
Mean / share in %
Age in years 37.3 37.8 38.7 37.5
Female 41 47 38 43
Marital status single 28 26 29 27
Female and married 23 29 22 27
Female and mother tongue not German/French/Italian 13 19 15 15
Female and mother tongue Italian 4 4 3 4
Mother tongue German 36 34 32 33
Mother tongue French 19 19 18 20
Mother tongue Italian 11 9 11 11
Mother tongue not German/French/Italian 34 38 39 36
German mother tongue and living in 'German language' canton 33 32 30 29
French mother tongue and living in 'French language' canton 18 17 16 19
Italian mother tongue and living in 'Italian language' canton 4 2 6 4
Nationality: Foreign with permanent permit 31 28 29 31
Foreign with yearly permit 15 18 18 16
Swiss 54 55 53 53
Foreign Languages: Other Swiss language 64 65 66 64
English, Spanish, Portuguese 13 16 10 16
Job position very low 37 38 47 36
high (management, etc.) 5 7 3 7
Qualification level: skilled (highest) 55 56 48 56
semiskilled 17 15 17 15
unskilled (lowest) 28 29 35 29
Chances to find a job no information 8 5 5 6
very easy 6 4 5 7
easy 17 14 13 15
medium 56 58 53 54
difficult 11 16 20 16
special case 2 2 4 2
Looking for ... job part time 11 13 10 13
Unemployment-status full-time 85 84 86 83
part time 13 14 12 15
Desired = previous occupation, 2-digit level 75 71 70 75
Previous occupation: construction 10 5 8 8
textiles 1 2 2 1
architecture, engineer 1 3 2 2
transportation 4 2 5 4
restaurants 17 15 14 17
entrepreneurs, senior officials, justice 2 4 2 4
office and computer 12 18 13 15
retail trade 7 10 7 8
science 1 2 1 3
news and communication 1 1 1 1
Table A.3 to be continued.
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Table A.3 continued – 1
Variable
Subsidised
temporary
job
Courses Employ-
ment pro-
gramme
Nonpar-
ticipation
Mean / share in %
Previous sector: construction 18 10 12 14
public services 6 8 10 10
education 2 1 2 2
industry unemployment rate in %, 1/98 6.7 6.3 6.3 6.7
Monthly earnings in last job in CHF 3970 3962 3660 3948
Monthly earnings in last job > 5000  CHF 20 22 14 22
Average earnings in CHF 1993 / 1992 3050 2990 2750 3070
Average earnings in CHF 1997 / 1996 2820 2680 2240 2540
Nondecreasing earnings path before 1997 11 11 8 8
Current unemployment spell is first spell 55 65 64 57
Positive number of sanction days without benefit payment (current spell) 22 25 25 28
Duration of unemployment spell at beginning of programme in days 222 229 303 218
Unemployment benefits in 1995 3260 3270 4390 3390
in 1996 3400 2620 3160 4280
in 1997 11170 12800 13800 14360
Number of UE spells  1997-1993 1.25 0.93 1.21 1.20
1992-1988 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.36
Month of entry into social security system 11 16 13 12
Immigrant 1992 or later 3 6 5 4
Number of employment spells 1988-1997 3.59 3.07 3.52 3.60
Mean duration of previous unemployment spells in months 5.19 6.14 6.19 5.76
Self-employment 1992 or later 3 4 3 5
Out of labour force 1992 or later 15 20 21 19
Months out of labour force '88-'97 (minimum duration of each spell: 6 months) 1.79 1.84 2.08 1.88
Months out of labour force (month of entry – months UE – months employed) 13 14 15 15
Previous programme participation : sum of short programs 7-12/1997 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.05
Subsidised temporary job before July 97 3 1 1 1
Begin of programme in 1998 (month) 3.79 3.38 5.03 2.82
Size of town (previous employment) > 200.000 6 10 8 8
Region of placement office  (reference categories: large city) rural 19 18 18 16
middle town 41 39 46 37
Region (reference category: Zurich) West 21 17 29 16
Eastern 10 11 7 9
Central 5 8 7 5
South-west 28 22 22 30
North-west 11 14 9 9
Ticino 7 4 9 9
Cantons Aargau 5 8 4 4
Basel-City 3 4 3 3
Geneva 7 6 4 13
Graubünden 1 2 1 1
Neuenburg 3 1 6 3
Solothurn 4 3 5 2
St. Gall 5 5 2 4
Waadt 12 13 12 13
Zug 1 1 1 1
% of people against stricter unemployment insurance law (national referendum in
1997; disaggregated at local level)
45 47 44 45
Table A.3 to be continued
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Table A.3 continued - 2
Variable
Subsidised
temporary
job
Courses Employ-
ment pro-
gramme
Nonpar-
ticipation
Mean / share in %
Employment with duration > 3 months 1998/04 20 9 4 22
1998/08 40 24 16 40
1998/12 41 30 22 38
1999/04 57 46 41 50
1999/08 70 58 54 57
1999/12 66 61 59 53
Searching for a job 1998/04 81 91 96 75
1998/08 58 73 84 49
1998/12 54 64 75 46
1999/04 38 47 56 33
1999/08 23 30 35 20
1999/12 24 21 23 19
Earnings in employment > 3 months 1998/04 728 332 128 843
1998/08 1463 935 514 1549
1998/12 1485 1204 725 1487
1999/04 2157 1810 1324 1912
1999/08 2603 2191 1781 2143
1999/12 2395 2248 1845 1959
Employment without fall in earnings 1998/04 11 5 2 13
1998/08 22 14 8 25
1998/12 23 18 12 22
1999/04 36 30 24 31
1999/08 43 35 30 34
1999/12 39 35 29 30
Months of unemployment 1998/04 6.28 7.79 8.72 5.11
1998/08 4.61 5.77 6.50 3.51
1998/12 3.28 3.77 4.03 2.33
Appendix B Estimates of the multinomial probit model
Table B.1 shows the estimation results of a multinomial probit model (MNP) using simulated maximum
likelihood with the GHK simulator.19 Although being fully parametric, the MNP is a flexible version of a
discrete choice model, because it does not require the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption
to hold.
                                                          
19 See for example Börsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou (1993) and Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994).
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Table B.1: Estimated coefficients of a multinomial probit model for participation in a programme
Variable
Courses Employment
programme
Non-
participation
Age in years / 10 .05 .18 -.001
Female -.13 -.35 -.28
Marital status single .09 .23 .08
Female and married .06 .02 .24
Female and mother tongue not German/French/Italian .17 0 0
Female and mother tongue Italian 0 -.39 0
Mother tongue not German/French/Italian .04 .15 .06
German mother tongue and living in 'German language' canton -.27 .08 -.03
French mother tongue and living in 'French language' canton .12 -.07 -.14
Italian mother tongue and living in 'Italian language' canton .02 .38 -.28
Nationality: Foreign with permanent permit -.11 -.17 .05
Foreign with yearly permit -.03 -.06 .05
Foreign Languages: Other Swiss language .07 .02 -.05
English, Spanish, Portuguese .19 -.06 .08
Job position very low .03 .20 .06
high (management, etc.) 0 0 .26
Qualification level: skilled (highest) .05 -.003 .09
unskilled (lowest) .04 -.007 .04
Chances to find a job (reference category: medium): no information -.13 -.23 -.01
very easy -.02 -.14 .17
easy -.12 -.10 .001
difficult .13 .20 .19
special case .15 .39 .49
Looking for ... job part time .10 -.01 .28
Unemployment-status (reference category: part-time): full-time .12 .23 .05
Desired = previous occupation, 2-digit level -.07 -.02 .05
Previous occupation: construction -.11 -.03 .12
textiles .27 .42 .33
architecture, engineer .44 .21 .09
transportation -.22 0 0
restaurants .003 -.14 .06
entrepreneurs, senior officials, justice .36 .08 .34
office and computer .40 .15 .15
retail trade .32 -.06 .16
science .20 .30 .57
news and communication .47 0 0
Previous sector: construction -.16 0 0
public services .06 .16 .13
education -.30 0 0
industry unemployment rate in %, 1/98 -.07 -.13 -.02
Monthly earnings in last job in CHF /1000 .01 -.09 -.09
Monthly earnings in last job > 5000  CHF 0 0 .14
Average earnings in CHF 1993 - 1992 /1000 .006 0.01 .03
Average earnings in CHF 1997 - 1996 /1000 -.014 -.09 -.02
Nondecreasing earnings path before 1997 -.07 -.12 -.13
Table B.1 to be continued.
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Table B.1 continued
Variable
Courses Employment
programme
Non-
participation
Current unemployment spell is first spell .12 .18 .04
Positive number of sanction days without benefit payment (current spell) .02 .08 .22
Duration of unemployment spell at beginning of programme /100 -.06 .04 .13
Duration of unemployment spell at beginning of programme < 3 months -.24 -.34 .21
< 6 months -.08 -.28 .13
Unemployment benefits/1000 in 1995 .006 .009 -.006
in 1996 -.007 -.004 .013
in 1997 .003 .006 .011
Number of UE spells  1997-1993 -.04 .03 -.01
1992-1988 -.07 .07 .05
Month of entry into social security system .41 .17 .05
Immigrant 1992 or later .08 .07 .002
Number of employment spells 1988-1997 -.04 -.01 .02
Mean duration of unemployment spells in months .86 0 0
Self-employment 1992 or later .09 -.05 .27
Out of labour force 1992 or later .11 .08 .12
Months out of labour force '88-'97 (minimum duration of 6 months for each spell) .003 0 .003
Months out of labour force (month of entry – months UE – months employed) .003 .01 -.004
Previous programme participation : Sum of short programs 7-12/1997 .11 0 0
Subsidised temporary job before July 97 -.18 .27 0
Begin of programme in 1998 (month) -.02 .05 -.16
Size of town (previous employment) > 200.000 .10 .23 .16
Region of placement office  (reference categories: large city) rural -.12 .02 -.07
middle town 0 0 -.11
% of people against stricter unemployment insurance law (national referendum in
1997; disaggregated at local level)
-.05 -.05 .03
Region (reference category: Zurich) West -.18 .53 -.12
Eastern .08 .23 -.18
Central .45 .49 -.16
South-west -.65 .19 -.23
North-west -.15 .06 -.30
Ticino -.49 .43 .65
Additional regional effects by canton Aargau .41 0 0
Basel-City 0 0 .24
Geneva 0 -.48 .86
Graubünden .20 0 0
Neuenburg -.75 0 .53
Solothurn 0 .19 -.42
St. Gall 0 -.67 0
Waadt .29 0 .86
Zug -.81 0 0
Note: Simulated maximum likelihood estimates using the GHK simulator (200 draws in simulator for each observation and
choice equation). Coefficients of the category TEMP are normalised to zero. All equations include a constant. Inference
is based on the outer product of the gradient estimate of the covariance matrix of the coefficients ignoring simulation
error. N = 18354. Value of log-likelihood function: - 22109.2.
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 1% level (2-sided test), numbers in italics relate to the 5% level.
If not stated otherwise, all information in the variables relates to the last day in December 1997.
The variables that are used in the MNP are selected by a preliminary specification search based on binary
probits (each relative to the reference category SUBSIDISED TEMPORARY JOB) and score tests against
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omitted variables. Entries for variables excluded from a particular choice equation show a 0 for the coef-
ficient and '-' for the standard error. The final specification contains a varying number of mainly discrete
variables that cover groups of attributes related to personal characteristics, valuations of individual skill
and chances on the labour market as assessed by the placement office, previous and desired future occu-
pations, and information related to the current and previous unemployment spell, and past employment
and earnings.
In practice, some restrictions on the covariance matrix of the error terms of the MNP need to be imposed,
because not all elements of the covariance matrix are identified and to avoid excessive numerical instabil-
ity. Guided by considerations of similarity of options and sample size, we allowed for free correlations
between SUBSIDISED TEMPORARY JOB and the other three alternatives (for details see Table B.1).
Table B.2: Estimated covariance and correlation matrices of the error terms in the multinomial probit
Subsidised temporary
job
courses employment
programmes
nonparticipation
Coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val
Covariance matrix a)
TEMP 1.0 - .95 5.25 -.03 -.11 -.18 -.46
Courses 1.9 - -.03 - -.17 -
EP 1.0 - .01 -
Nonparticipation 1.03 -
Correlation matrix a)  x 100
TEMP 100 69 -3 -17
Courses 100 -2 -12
EP 100 6
Nonparticipation 100
Note: a)  3 Cholesky factors are estimated to ensure that the covariance of the errors remains positive definite. t-values
refer to the test whether the corresponding Cholesky factor is zero.
Appendix C: Common support
As proposed, discussed and applied in GL and Lechner (2001, 2002a, b) we base the common support
requirement on the marginal choice probabilities (conditional on X) for all alternatives. By doing so, we
ensure that all effects are estimated for the same underlying support. Table C.1 shows the minima and the
maxima of the estimated probabilities. In total the common step criteria discarded about 3.1% of the ob-
servations. Table C.2 shows that the largest shares of 'lost observations' appear for NP (4.3%) and TEMP
(3.4%). However, overall these numbers appear to be low. Although Table C.3 shows that high-skilled
Swiss living in large towns not in the south-west appear to have a lower probability to be rejected by the
common support criterion, the overall impact on the estimates must be small due to the small number of
rejected cases.
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Table C.1: Minima and maxima of ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )]TEMP Courses EP NPN N N NP x P x P x P x  in subsamples
Subsamples ˆ ( )TEMPP X ˆ ( )CoursesP X ˆ ( )EPP X ˆ ( )NPP X
maximum in subsample
Subsidised temporary job 81 78 60 78
Courses 77 79 66 76
Employment programmes 74 79 69 71
Nonparticipation 74 73 69 91
Minimum of maxima 74 73 60 71
minimum in subsample
Subsidised temporary job 4.5 2.3 .05 1.1
Courses 2.9 4.5 .12 .96
Employment programmes 3.0 3.5 .70 .22
Nonparticipation 2.6 2.8 .01 2.3
Maximum of minima 4.5 4.5 .70 2.3
Note: Estimated probabilities in %.
Table C.2: Loss of observations due to common support requirement
Subsidised
temporary job
Courses Employment
programme
Nonparticipation
Observations before 5365 5421 2107 5461
Observations after 5182 5294 2085 5225
Percent deleted 3.4 2.3 1.0 4.3
Note: The total number of observations decreases due to the enforcement of the  common support requirement from 18354 to
17786 (-3.1%).
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Table C.3: Comparison of means of selected variables in the subsample used for matching and the
subsample not used for matching because of insufficient overlap
Variable
Observations used
for matching
Observations not
used for matching
Number of observations 17786 568
shares in %
  Mother tongue
Not G/I/F 37 32
  Chances to find a job
Special case 2 2
  Qualification
Unskilled 30 18
  Previous Occupation
Metals 7 3
Restaurants 16 16
Office and computer 15 20
Retail trade 8 9
  Region
Eastern 10 16
South-west 26 47
Central 6 3
  Region of placement office
Large city 41 54
  Social security data
Month of entry into social security system 13 11
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Appendix D: Additional results concerning subgroup heterogeneity
Table D.1: Dynamics of average effects (ATE) for employment without earnings loss – Low sectoral share
of TEMP workers compared to unemployed, age above 35 only
Month after
begin
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
older than 35 only Low sectoral share of TEMP workers
TEMP (1) compared to EP (0)
3 15 6 7 18 8 6
9 26 15 7 29 18 8
15 39 27 8 43 29 10
21 43 33 (7) 46 36 (5)
TEMP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 15 16 (-2) 18 21 -3
9 26 22 (2) 29 26 3
15 39 29 7 43 34 8
21 43 30 10 46 36 8
EP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 6 16 -9 8 21 -9
9 15 22 -5 18 26 -5
15 27 29 (-1) 29 34 (-1)
21 33 30 (3) 36 36 (3)
Note: Outcome variable is employed for at least 3 months with average earnings more than 90% of previous earnings. Re-
sults are based on matched samples. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (2-sided test). Sample sizes
TEMP / courses / EP / NONP for older 35 years: 2637 / 2826 / 1212 / 2623.Sample sizes TEMP / courses / EP / NONP
for low sectoral share of TEMP workers: 3259 / 3099 / 1244 / 3294.
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Table D.2: Dynamics of average effects (ATE) for employment without earnings loss – sex
Month after
begin
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
women men
TEMP (1) compared to EP (0)
3 13 7 7 20 8 9
9 26 21 5 30 17 7
15 37 30 (6) 45 30 10
21 40 31 10 48 37 (6)
TEMP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 13 15 (-1) 20 21 (-1)
9 26 21 6 30 28 (0)
15 37 28 9 45 37 7
21 40 28 9 48 40 6
EP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 7 15 -8 8 21 -10
9 21 21 (0) 17 28 -6
15 30 28 (4) 30 37 (-4)
21 31 28 (-1) 37 40 (0)
Note: Outcome variable is employed for at least 3 months with average earnings more than 90% of previous earnings. Re-
sults are based on matched samples. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (2-sided test). Sample sizes
TEMP / courses / EP / NONP for women: 2106 / 2484 / 776 / 2193.Sample sizes TEMP / courses / EP / NONP for men:
2991 / 2719 / 1298 / 2861.
Table D.3: Dynamics of average effects (ATE) for employment without earnings loss – skill level
Month after
begin
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
skilled unskilled
TEMP (1) compared to EP (0)
3 17 7 8 17 8 8
9 30 21 7 27 15 9
15 42 31 9 42 30 9
21 46 35 8 42 33 (3)
TEMP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 17 19 -4 17 20 (-2)
9 30 28 (2) 27 22 (4)
15 42 35 7 42 33 12
21 46 38 6 42 33 (5)
EP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 7 19 -12 8 20 -9
9 21 28 -5 15 22 -6
15 31 35 (-2) 30 33 (3)
21 35 38 (-2) 33 33 (2)
Note: Outcome variable is employed for at least 3 months with average earnings more than 90% of previous earnings. Re-
sults are based on matched samples. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (2-sided test). Sample sizes
TEMP / courses / EP / NONP for skilled: 2782 / 2925 / 1007 / 2808.Sample sizes TEMP / courses / EP / NONP for
unskilled: 1462 / 1499 / 697 / 1510.
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Table D.4: Estimates of effects (by previous earnings) with “employment without earnings loss” as
outcome
Month after
begin
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
1( | 1)E Y S  0( | 0)E Y S  1,0 1 0ˆ ( )  N E Y Y
High previous earnings (> CHF 4000) Low previous earnings (< CHF 3000)
TEMP (1) compared to EP (0)
3 17 7 6 17 10 11
9 27 16 (4) 31 24 8
15 40 26 8 42 34 6
21 45 33 8 47 34 10
TEMP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 17 19 (-3) 17 16 (2)
9 27 27 (0) 31 20 11
15 40 34 6 42 29 15
21 45 37 7 47 31 11
EP (1) compared to NONP (0)
3 7 19 -9 10 16 -9
9 16 27 -5 24 20 (4)
15 26 34 (-2) 34 29 9
21 33 37 (-2) 34 31 (1)
Note: Outcome variable is employed for at least 3 months with average earnings more than 90% of previous earnings. Re-
sults are based on matched samples. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (2-sided test). Sample sizes
TEMP / courses / EP / NONP for earnings > 4000: 2247 / 2134 / 751 / 2089. Sample sizes TEMP / courses / EP /
NONP for UE < 3000: 1256 / 1537 / 705 / 1436.
